The Serbian government is considering using funds seized from organized crime to finance its infrastructure projects, potentially following Italy’s recent initiative to invest approximately 200 million euros confiscated from mafia activities into enhancing its railway system. This approach, which involves redirecting the seized funds into enhancing railway safety, prompts discussions on whether Serbia could adopt a similar model to reduce its reliance on foreign loans, particularly those from China.
In Italy, the decision to utilize seized criminal assets for public infrastructure followed extensive investigations that led to the capture of significant wealth from one of Sicily’s notorious drug lords, Matteo Messina Denaro. This move has sparked interest in Serbia, where the legal framework for asset seizure has been in place since 2008, with subsequent amendments. The Serbian law allows for the temporary or permanent confiscation of assets obtained through criminal activities, managed by the Directorate for Management of Seized Assets.
According to the State Audit Institution’s report, Serbia has amassed a substantial portfolio of assets seized in criminal proceedings, valued at over 45 billion dinars (approximately 380 million euros) from 2009 to the end of 2024. However, the majority of this wealth remains in a temporary legal status, pending final court decisions. This includes a diverse range of assets such as real estate, vehicles, businesses, and even art, highlighting the complexity and breadth of Serbia’s asset seizure program.
Despite the potential financial benefits, experts caution against relying on these uncertain revenue streams for critical infrastructure projects. Nemanja Nenadić, Program Director of Transparency Serbia, emphasizes the need for predictable and stable funding sources for infrastructure, which cannot depend on the unpredictable nature of asset seizures. He suggests that while the Italian model is intriguing, Serbia must first address inefficiencies in its judicial processes to expedite the finalization of asset confiscation cases.
The Serbian government currently channels proceeds from asset sales into the general budget, where they are indistinguishable from other revenues, making it difficult to track their specific use. This contrasts with Italy’s approach, where the allocation of such funds is determined by government decision, allowing for targeted investments in pressing public needs.
Nenadić also points out the necessity for Serbia to enhance transparency and accountability in managing seized assets. This includes publicizing the allocation of confiscated properties, which are sometimes donated to public institutions for various uses, such as kindergartens or social services. The lack of detailed public records on these allocations underscores the need for greater openness in the process.
For Serbia to effectively implement a model similar to Italy’s, it must not only streamline its legal procedures but also ensure that infrastructure projects are planned based on well-defined development strategies. This includes conducting public tenders rather than relying on direct agreements, which can compromise transparency and cost-effectiveness.
The discussion around using seized criminal assets for public investment also raises broader questions about Serbia’s approach to tackling organized crime and corruption. Nenadić notes that the country must intensify its efforts to initiate more cases against corrupt activities and apply asset seizure mechanisms
